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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This analysis, prepared for the Health Care Financing Administration and the 
Health Resources and Services Administration, examines issues that arise under 
laws designed to avert excessive cost-sharing in the case of low income families 
whose children participate in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP). High cost-sharing has been shown to significantly affect children’s 
participation in insurance programs, as well as their utilization of health services.  
As a result, the Federal CHIP legislation, while permitting cost-sharing under 
certain circumstances, also places limitations on the total amount of cost-sharing 
to which families can be exposed for services covered by State CHIP plans. 
 
 
In examining possible mechanisms for implementing the CHIP cost-sharing 
protections, it is important to understand the extent of the potential problem – that 
is, the proportion of participating families that in fact might be exposed to high 
cost-sharing.  It is also important to understand the factors that can be expected 
to influence the size of the affected population.  After assessing the 
circumstances under which families might face high cost-sharing, we conclude 
that only a small proportion of all children would likely have annual health 
expenditures that meet or exceed five percent of total family income, even in the 
case of lower income families.  Once coverage under existing CHIP programs is 
taken into account, the number of such children becomes extremely small.  Of 
the estimated four million targeted low income children, about 68,000 high-need 
children can be expected to use CHIP-covered services at sufficiently high rates 
to trigger the law’s cost-sharing protections.  These children can be expected to 
be concentrated in the 17 States with relatively limited Medicaid coverage and 
broader CHIP plans (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia).  In States that have extensive 
outreach programs through health providers, the concentration may increase.  
 
 
However, for children with high cost health needs, States might wish to consider 
various means to lessen the effects of cost-sharing.  Moreover, mechanisms for 
reducing the burden of cost-sharing would take on additional importance if States 
elect to either increase their premiums and copayments or add deductibles and 
coinsurance.  Some of the design options might aid even those families whose 
children’s average health needs nonetheless create a burden, because of the 
disjunction between the timing of the need and the annual framework against 
which  “excess” expenditures are to be measured under the law. 
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♦ The first option is to not impose more than nominal premiums and 
copayments, and to avoid the use of high deductibles and coinsurance that 
could present significant barriers to utilization.  No State program at the 
present time appears to use deductibles; at least one State uses coinsurance.  
Some States use premiums alone, others, copayments alone.  As of February 
1999, only half of the 25 States with freestanding programs used both 
premiums and copayments. 
 
♦ The second option entails strategies for accelerating the rate at which a 
family’s expenses accrue towards reaching the cap.  More specifically, States 
could permit families to count:  
• incurred and projected expenditures toward services covered under the 
plan rather than only actual expenditures; 
• retrospective expenditures that were generated prior to the date of 
application to the program. 
 
♦ The third option involves strategies designed to reduce the actual dollar value 
of the cap, thereby making it easier for a low income family to reach the limit 
on cost-sharing.  These strategies include:  
• calculating the cap based on net rather than gross income;  
• using a lower cap; 
• creating a deduction for medical and health costs not covered under the 
State CHIP plan in order to lower countable income.  The development of 
a deduction system to lower countable income would complement the 
protection of the five percent cap.  The cap applies only to services 
covered under State CHIP plans and thus does not apply to expenditures 
for non-covered services, which in the case of certain plans that track 
commercial insurance could be considerable.  As in the Medicaid spend-
down program, a State could deduct from income the cost of expenses 
incurred for uncovered costs, such as additional services that exceed 
coverage limits or services that are totally uncovered. 
 
 
These options, if pursued, have important implications for the design of 
freestanding State CHIP plans. At the present time, enrollment in freestanding 
programs is relatively low, a result that is not unexpected at the beginning of a 
new program.  However, relatively generous policies that reduce or eliminate 
families’ cost-sharing burdens could encourage greater enrollment by families 
whose children have chronic health care needs and increase utilization.  Under 
these circumstances, the actuarial assumptions on which the State’s premiums 
are based could be significantly affected.  In States in which coverage for CHIP 
children is purchased through a larger pool (e.g., the State employee plan or the 
Medicaid managed care program), the additional assistance for low income 
families with sick children might have only a very slight effect on the overall 
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premium, but the effect could be more pronounced in States that buy coverage 
for CHIP children on a freestanding basis.   
 
 
Thus, if a State with a freestanding program of limited size were to elect to take 
advantage of one or more options for reducing the cost-sharing obligations of 
lower income families, it would have to consider the actuarial implications of 
these design modifications.  Were these implications not taken into account, a 
State might experience market pull-out by plans or attempts to severely limit 
utilization through other means in order to offset the utilization enhancing effects 
of removing cost-sharing barriers. 
 
 
For the few states where tracking family expenditures toward the five percent cap 
may be an issue, three main mechanisms other than the “shoebox” approach 
currently used by all states (and by private insurers as well) may be considered.   
 
♦ First, States could require in their contracts that participating plans acquire 
“swipe card” technology, issue a plastic magnetic stripe membership card to 
each family, and equip their providers with “point-of-service” electronic 
connectivity.     
 
♦ Second, States could issue a “credit card” to each family, who would present 
it to the provider at the time of service.  The provider would then call a 
telephone number to seek authorization of payment from the State, which in 
turn would pay the provider and obtain reimbursement of copayments from 
the family. 
 
♦ Third, States could assign a case manager to high cost children identified by 
the State through a health status assessment performed at enrollment, and 
through a requirement that providers notify the State of new qualifying cases 
in the post-enrollment phase. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This analysis, prepared for the Health Care Financing Administration and the Health 
Resources and Services Administration, examines issues that arise under certain provisions of 
law designed to avert excessive cost-sharing (i.e., cost-sharing resulting in total out-of-pocket 
expenditures that are greater than five percent of annual family income) in the case of low 
income families whose children participate in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP).  High cost-sharing has been shown to significantly affect children’s participation in 
insurance programs as well as their utilization of health services.1  As a result, the Federal CHIP 
legislation, while permitting cost-sharing under certain circumstances, also places limitations on 
the total amount of cost-sharing to which families can be exposed. 
 
The first part of this analysis presents a background and an overview of CHIP cost-
sharing provisions.  Part Two considers two basic issues. The first issue relates to the 
magnitude of the potential problem itself.  In examining possible mechanisms for implementing 
CHIP cost-sharing protections, it is important to consider the proportion of participating families 
that in fact might be exposed to excessive cost-sharing.  It is also important to understand the 
factors that can be expected to influence the size of the affected population.  
 
The second issue considered is the range of mechanisms available to States to ensure 
that families have proper access to cost-sharing protections.  The feasibility of these 
mechanisms has a good deal to do with the nature of the program as well as the potential size 
of the problem that the mechanisms are designed to address. 
 
The analysis concludes with a series of recommendations for Federal and State policy 
makers. 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Ku L, Coughlin T. The use of sliding scale premiums in subsidized insurance programs. 
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, March 1997; Anderson G, Brook R, Williams A. A comparison of 
cost-sharing versus free care in children: Effects on the demand for office-based medical care. Medical 
Care 1991;29(9):890-898, and other studies cited in Markus A, Rosenbaum S, Roby D. CHIP, health 
insurance premiums and cost-sharing: Lessons from the literature. Washington, DC: Center for Health 
Policy Research, October 1998. 
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This analysis is based on research undertaken by the Center for Health Services 
Research and Policy (CHSRP), individual telephone discussions with representatives of several 
managed care organizations offering products that include upper limits on cost-sharing, and a 
meeting of Federal and State policy makers and health insurance experts that was conducted at 
CHSRP in the fall of 1998.  
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PART ONE. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
 
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a Federal grant-in-aid statute 
codified at Title XXI of the Social Security Act,2 the purpose of which is to assist States to 
provide “child health assistance” to certain “targeted low income” children.3  A State that elects 
to participate in CHIP can choose one of three program options.  The State may apply its 
Federal funds toward an expansion of its Medicaid program for children. Alternatively, the State 
could establish a freestanding child health assistance program for children who are ineligible for 
Medicaid, group health insurance, or other health coverage.  Third, a State can combine the two 
approaches (i.e., a limited Medicaid expansion reaching poorer children, coupled with the 
establishment of a freestanding program for less poor children).  As of April 1999, forty-seven 
States had received approval of their CHIP plans from the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA); of those, twenty-five had implemented, or indicated their intent to establish, separate 
CHIP plans either in whole or in part for targeted low income children.4 
 
States that elect to administer CHIP as Medicaid expansions either in whole or in part 
must comply with Federal Medicaid law with respect to targeted low income children. The 
Federal Medicaid statute prohibits virtually all cost-sharing in the case of categorically needy 
children under age 18 (i.e., children who are eligible for Medicaid by virtue of family income and 
resources alone, without taking into account medical expenditures made on their behalf).5  
Children who qualify for Medicaid after “spending down” excess income and resources to a 
State’s medically needy income level (which in 1998 averaged about 50 percent of the federal 
                                               
2 Section 2101 et seq. of the Social Security Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397 et. seq. 
3 Section 2110(b) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(b).  A “targeted low income” child is a child who has been 
determined to be eligible for child health assistance and who is either a “low income” child (i.e., a child 
whose family income is at or below 200 percent of the Federal poverty level) or a child whose family 
income (as determined by the State under its plan) exceeds the Medicaid applicable income level by no 
more than 50 percentage points. 
4 Children’s Health Insurance Program reaches 1998 target—Nearly one million enrolled, White House 
Press Release, April 20, 1999.  Riley T, Pernice C. How Are States Implementing Children’s Health 
Insurance Plans? An Analysis and Summary of State Plans Submitted to the Health Care Financing 
Administration. Portland, ME: National Academy for State Health Policy, September 1998.   
5 Section 1916(a) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1396o(a).  States may impose limited monthly premiums in the 
case of poverty-level pregnant women and infants whose family incomes as defined in the statute equal 
or exceed 150 percent of the Federal poverty level.  
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poverty level for a family of three) are exempted from further cost-sharing.6  While all children 
enrolled in Medicaid qualify on the basis of income alone and not through spend-down, the 
spend-down program is important for children with very high cost needs.  Nineteen of the 25 
States with freestanding programs also maintain a spend-down program for medically needy 
children.7 
 
States that elect to administer CHIP in whole or in part as freestanding programs may 
impose cost-sharing (i.e., premiums, enrollment fees, deductibles, coinsurance and 
copayments) under certain circumstances.  Cost-sharing, if imposed, must be in accordance 
with a public schedule.8  States may vary cost-sharing but only in a manner that does not favor 
higher income children over lower income children.9  No deductibles, copayments, or other cost-
sharing may be imposed on preventive services, defined as well-baby and well-child care 
including age-appropriate immunizations.10  
 
Federal law establishes different cost-sharing protections for children enrolled in 
freestanding programs, depending on family income levels.  In the case of CHIP-enrolled 
children with family incomes at or below 150 percent of the Federal poverty level, the law 
prohibits cost-sharing that exceeds permissible levels for non-exempt Medicaid beneficiairies 
(e.g., non-pregnant adults).11  Thus, States must maintain deductibles, cost-sharing, and other 
similar charges at “nominal” levels, as the term is defined by the Secretary in Federal Medicaid 
regulations.12  
                                               
6 42 C.F.R. §447.53(b). 
7 State Plan Amendments.  Commerce Clearinghouse Medicare and Medicaid Guide, February 1999. 
8 Section 2103(e)(1)(A) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(e)(1)(A). 
9 Section 2103(e)(1)(B) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(e)(1)(B). 
10 Section 2103(c)(1)(D) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(c)(1)(D). 
11 Section 2103(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(e)(3)(A)(i).  At first blush, this section seems 
tautological, since Medicaid prohibits cost-sharing in the case of children.  However, the provision is 
understood to permit cost-sharing in the case of CHIP children to the same extent that it is permitted in 
the case of non-exempt beneficiaries. 
12 Section 2103(e)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act; 42 C.F.R. §447.52. Federal guidelines permit premiums up to $19 
per month, depending on family income and size. Proposed Federal standards would permit co-payments 
to vary, depending on whether services are delivered in a fee-for-service or managed care system. (Letter 
to State Medicaid Directors from Sally Richardson, February 13, 1998)  Proposed fee-for-service cost-
sharing standards are as follows: $1 for services of $15 or less, $2 for services between $15.01 and $40, 
$3 for services between $40.01 and $80, and $5 for services over $80.  Managed care cost-sharing 
would permit co-payments of up to $5 for all services, except for inappropriate use of emergency room 
services, for which copayments may be set at up to $10. 
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In the case of “other children” (i.e., CHIP-enrolled children with family incomes above 
150 percent of the Federal poverty level), the Medicaid rules do not apply; instead the statute 
provides that:  
 
 * * * any premiums, deductibles, cost-sharing or similar charges imposed under 
the State child health plan may be imposed on a sliding scale related to income, 
except that the total annual aggregate cost-sharing with respect to all targeted 
low income children in a family under this title may not exceed 5 percent of such 
family’s income for the year involved.13 (emphasis added) 
 
While the statute appears to limit the five percent cost-sharing protection to families with 
incomes above 150 percent of Federal poverty level, HCFA has interpreted this provision more 
broadly and has applied the five percent cap to families with incomes below 150 percent of the 
Federal poverty level.   
 
Under this provision, a family’s total annual aggregate expenditures on cost-sharing 
under a State’s CHIP plan cannot exceed five percent of the family’s total annual family income. 
This aggregate upper limit on total family cost-sharing expenditures consequently is referred to 
as a “cumulative maximum” limit on cost-sharing.14  For purposes of this analysis, we refer to 
the statutory cumulative maximum amount as the “five percent cap.”  The cap parallels the type 
of cumulative maximum limits found in numerous private insurance contracts.  In the case of 
private insurance, however, the cumulative maximum limit is almost always expressed in dollar 
terms (e.g., a $3,000 limit on out-of-pocket payments for covered services).   
 
The CHIP statute leaves to State discretion the standards and methodologies that a 
State may use in establishing its cost-sharing policies.  As long as a State adheres to the 
nominality rule and the “five percent cap” standard, it may decide, for example, what types of 
cost-sharing to use.  Similarly, a State may decide whether to count only actually paid or also 
incurred obligations in calculating a family’s out-of-pocket payments.  A State could also decide 
to project regularly recurring cost-sharing (e.g., a monthly premium) in calculating the cap.  
                                               
13 Section 2103(e)(3)(B) of the Act; 42 U.S.C.  1397cc(e)(3)(B).   
14 Federal Medicaid regulations permit, but do not require, a State to set cumulative maximum amounts 
for all deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments that it “imposes on any family during a specified period 
of time.” 42 C.F.R. §447.54(d). 
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Because a State has the authority to determine what constitutes “income” for purposes of 
calculating the cap, the State effectively can influence the dollar size of the cap. 
 
From a policy perspective, the CHIP premium and cost-sharing provisions may be 
viewed as an attempt to balance two interests: 1) a State’s interest in encouraging awareness of 
health care costs and appropriate use of services and 2) low income families’ interest in being 
able to obtain access to necessary health care for their children without undue financial burden. 
Cost-sharing protections are important, since a substantial body of literature on cost-sharing in 
the case of lower income families suggests that excessive cost-sharing may deter both entry 
into health coverage systems and use of necessary health care.15   Application of Medicaid cost-
sharing standards to CHIP-enrolled children with incomes at or below 150 percent of the 
Federal poverty level helps ensure that these children are treated in a manner consistent with 
the standards that apply to the poorest adults.  The use of a cumulative maximum amount in the 
case of children with family incomes below and over 150 percent of the Federal poverty level 
may help ensure that children do not face unreasonable cost-sharing burdens when enrolled in 
CHIP.  
 
                                               
15 Markus A, et al., op.cit.  During the meeting conducted at CHSRP, the New York State CHIP official in 
attendance noted that the State had recently abandoned the cost-sharing requirements, since the 
estimated $3 million per year in cost-sharing that it collected was well below the State’s administrative 
costs related to collection.   The State also noted that there was insufficient inappropriate use of the 
emergency room to justify the $10 emergency room co-payment. 
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PART TWO. ISSUES IN STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE “FIVE PERCENT CAP” 
 
 
A. What is the Extent of Exposure to High Cost-Sharing Among 
Low Income Children? 
 
In devising mechanisms to ensure that families subject to the “five percent cap” actually 
receive the protections afforded them under the law, it is important to review in some detail at 
the outset the types of families who may be affected by cost-sharing in excess of the statutory 
limits, as well as the types of circumstances that can lead to elevated cost burdens.  This review 
shows that only a small proportion of CHIP-eligible children would likely have health 
expenditures that reach five percent of family income.  Once the current configuration of States’ 
freestanding programs is taken into account, the figure becomes extremely small.  
 
 Most children are healthy and use only limited amounts of health care in any year.  If five 
percent of income is used as the cutoff point for determining what is excessive, then in fact most 
lower income families would not face excessive cost-sharing burdens over the course of a year.  
Take, for example, a family consisting of two parents and two school-aged children, whose 
annual income stands at 200 percent of the Federal poverty level (which in 1998 dollars rounds 
to $32,000). For this family, out-of-pocket expenditures must exceed $1,600 before the five 
percent cap is reached, assuming that the cap is based on gross family income.   
 
If the family’s children are healthy, $1,600 represents a substantial amount of health 
care, even in today’s world.  Tables 1a and 1b (see p.28 and p.35) set forth health care 
utilization data for various types of children, using data from a series of health care expenditure 
studies. Using these data, we estimate that total annual medical care expenditures for a healthy 
child with an occasional cold or ear infection would amount to about $226.  Even if eyeglasses 
and dental care were added to this amount, total annual expenditures for both children probably 
would remain below the family’s five percent cap.  Even if both children in the family had routine 
health needs, expenditures probably would remain under the cap.  This, of course, is not to 
suggest that covering such expenditures with insurance is not extremely important, since a 
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family with such a modest level of income faces many competing needs for which there are no 
alternative financing mechanisms such as insurance.  However, if five percent is considered the 
affordability cutoff, then, in fact, most children would fall below the line. 
 
 Of course, looking at the issue of financial exposure for low income families in an 
annualized fashion as required under the law paints a somewhat false picture in a practical 
sense.  Children’s health expenditures tend to come in concentrated lumps (e.g., in one two-
month period, both children in the hypothetical family may become ill). To measure these 
monthly costs against the family’s annual income is misleading, since the family, if uninsured, 
may be forced to pay all of these costs in the month they occur, unless it has access to a public 
hospital clinic, health center, or other provider that charges only in accordance with a schedule 
that is adjusted for monthly family income or extends credit and allows payment over time.  
However, over the course of a year, the family’s financial exposure appears manageable.  
 
Furthermore, even were the wavelike aspect of much child health spending to be 
considered as a practical matter, legally speaking the statute, as previously noted, extends the 
protection against excessive financial burdens only in relation to annual income.  Given this fact, 
only families with children who have higher than normal annual health care costs could be 
expected to have annual expenditures that exceed five percent of annual income.   
 
Studies of childhood illness and disability suggest that the number of children with high 
annual health costs is relatively small.  Data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) 
indicate that approximately two-thirds of children are generally healthy16 and therefore probably 
are not likely to use services in sufficient quantity to reach the five percent cap during a year.  In 
addition to well-child care visits, these children may face an occasional minor illness (e.g., a 
cold or an ear infection), requiring medical care and prescribed drugs. On average, children 
make three ambulatory care visits annually, and physicians prescribe one medication during 
those visits.17  As noted, eyeglasses and dental care would add to these overall costs, but 
                                               
16 Newacheck PW, Taylor WR. Childhood chronic illness: Prevalence, severity, and impact. American 
Journal of Public Health 1992:82(3):364-371. 
17 Schappert SM.  Ambulatory care visits to physician offices, hospital outpatient departments, and 
emergency departments: United States, 1996. Vital and Health Statistics 1998:Series 13, Number 134. 
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typically not in sufficient amount to bring total annual health spending to levels considered 
excessive under CHIP (i.e., in excess of five percent of annual aggregate income). 
 
Compared to those who are healthy, children who suffer from one or more chronic 
conditions are significantly more likely to be high health care users. However, the NHIS data 
show that the presence of a chronic illness or disability alone does not translate into high health 
care costs.  NHIS data indicate that two-thirds of all children with chronic conditions are either 
never, or else only occasionally, bothered by their conditions and experience no limitations on 
their usual activities.  Therefore, the group that raises particular concerns in the context of high 
health care expenditures is one-third of the one-third of all children with chronic conditions 
(about 11 percent of all children).18   
 
Even among this group of children, however, the number with high health costs in a year 
may be small.  NHIS data further indicate that only 12 percent of children with chronic conditions 
(about four percent of all children) experience actual activity limitations, and only five percent of 
all children with chronic conditions (1.7 percent of all children) have severe conditions that both 
bother them and limit their daily activities.19   
 
Applying these figures to CHIP-eligible children, the number of children who face 
potentially high health costs can be expected to be extremely small.  Of the estimated four 
million targeted low income children, 1.33 million children (one-third) could be expected to have 
one or more chronic conditions.  Of these, 159,600 (12 percent of the 1.33 million) could be 
expected to experience actual activity limitations.  Only 68,000 (1.7 percent of the CHIP-eligible 
children) would possibly fall into the most severe category (i.e., children who have conditions 
that both bother them and limit their daily activities), the majority of whom will likely be 
concentrated at the lower income end of the scale (i.e. between 100 and 150 percent of the 
Federal poverty level). 
 
 
                                               
18 In addition, of course, a very small percentage of the two-thirds of otherwise healthy children could be 
expected to experience a catastrophic incident leading to high health costs. 
19 Childhood chronic illness, op. cit. 
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Even this 68,000 figure may overstate the number of children with high health care 
utilization patterns who might be affected by the five percent cap. This is because in six of the 
25 States with separate child health assistance programs (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Vermont), Medicaid coverage actually extends up to and past 
150 percent of the Federal poverty level.20  As noted, cost-sharing is virtually prohibited under 
Medicaid.  Because Medicaid eligibility turns on net rather than gross income, in these States, 
once Medicaid-required deductions and disregards are taken into account, most children with 
gross family income up to 200 percent of the Federal poverty level in fact probably would qualify 
for Medicaid and thus would be exempt from all cost-sharing. 
  
It is in 17 of the 19 other States with more limited Medicaid coverage and broader CHIP 
plans (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia)21 
where a greater proportion of targeted children could be enrolled in a freestanding program.   In 
these States, the five percent cap would be more relevant, because more children would need 
the cap as a protection against high cost-sharing.  Additionally, although the majority of states 
with freestanding programs also have a Medicaid medically needy spend-down program in 
place, families’ spend-down obligations would be quite large (Table A).  Thus, the alternative 
coverage route of Medicaid following a large spend-down would be far less desirable than being 
able to take advantage of immediate coverage through CHIP.  For example, a family of two with 
a monthly income of $1,672.75 (the equivalent of 185 percent of the Federal poverty level) 
would have to incur monthly medical expenses in excess of $1,000 in order to qualify for 
Medicaid spend-down coverage in Florida.   Again, even families with children who have higher 
than average health needs are not likely to spend that much on their children’s care. 
 
                                               
20 How Are States Implementing Children’s Health Insurance Plans?, op. cit. 
21 Id.  The two remaining States, Mississippi and Montana, have more limited CHIP plans with upper 
eligibility levels set at 133 and 150 percent of the federal poverty level, respectively. 
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TABLE A: HCFA-approved, stand-alone CHIP programs with a Medicaid 
Medically Needy Program 
 
 
States with 
stand-alone 
CHIP plans 
Medicaid 
Medically Needy 
Program? 
Medically Needy  
income level  
maximum per month  
for a family of two 
Date effective 
AL No N/A N/A 
AZ No N/A N/A 
CA Yes $750  7/1/89 
CO No N/A N/A 
CT Yes  up to $733.59  7/1/95 
DE No N/A N/A 
FL Yes $241  7/1/93 
GA Yes $317  10/1/91 
KS Yes $475  1/1/97 
KY Yes $266.67   1/1/92 
ME Yes $341  1/1/93 
MA Yes $650  4/1/98 
MI Yes $458  1/1/96 
MS No N/A N/A 
MT Yes $491  7/1/98 
NV No N/A N/A 
NH Yes $642  1/1/98 
NJ Yes $434  7/1/95 
NY Yes $833.33  1/1/97 
NC Yes $317  1/1/92 
OR Yes $884  5/1/97 
PA Yes $441.67  1/1/90 
UT Yes $456  10/1/95 
VT Yes $683 7/1/96 
VA Yes $400  6/14/89 
 
 
Source: State Plan Amendments.  Commerce Clearinghouse Medicare and Medicaid 
Guide, February 1999. 
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Thus, the five percent cap would appear to have the greatest potential importance for 
severely ill children with family incomes between 150 percent and 200 percent of the Federal 
poverty level who live in the 17 States noted above that maintain relatively limited Medicaid  
coverage levels and freestanding child health assistance programs.  It is in these States that 
tracking expenditures for the several thousand CHIP-enrolled children with costly chronic 
illnesses takes on increased importance.  
 
To the extent that outreach to targeted children is particularly active among health 
providers serving chronically ill children, the proportion of CHIP children with chronic illness may 
be somewhat higher than would otherwise be the case under the population-wide figures from  
the NHIS.  Anecdotal evidence from State outreach programs suggests that health providers are 
particularly aware of the availability of CHIP and may be especially likely to actively refer and 
aid enrollment in the case of chronically ill high cost patients.  To the extent that outreach skews 
enrollment toward sicker children, this could elevate the proportion of children in State CHIP 
programs with costly conditions.  
 
In sum, while the five percent cap represents an important safeguard, its importance 
appears to be significantly limited in a number of respects.  The value of a cap this high is 
closely tied to the degree to which children experience illness or disability. Only a relatively few 
children are high health care users. Since the protection is triggered only when costs exceed a 
dollar threshold that is tied to annual income, the cap is unlikely to be of assistance for families 
whose children have routine health care needs, even if those needs occur at a concentrated 
point during the year. Additionally, the cap takes on its greatest meaning in the17 States with 
combined Medicaid/freestanding CHIP programs and relatively low Medicaid eligibility levels.  
Despite the low overall representation of children with high cost health needs in the general 
population, their numbers in CHIP may be higher in States that conduct outreach through health 
care providers, where awareness of the importance of enrolling in CHIP is particularly high. 
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B. State Options to Reduce Cost-Sharing Obligations   
 
 
For the reasons discussed above, the five percent cap provisions probably affect 
relatively few children.  Depending on how they design their programs, however, States might 
be able to create cost-sharing protections that aid more families.   
 
Federal law provides States with substantial flexibility to tailor their CHIP programs in 
ways that would reduce the cost-sharing burden on families, while retaining cost-sharing 
features.  The most obvious option is to not impose more than nominal premiums and 
copayments and to avoid the use of high deductibles that could present significant barriers to 
utilization.  Similarly, States could refrain from using coinsurance (i.e., a defined percentage of 
total charges for a service) to determine a patient’s contribution to the cost of care.  Unlike 
copayments, coinsurance is less predictable because it is based on the complexity of services 
received.  It is also more taxing financially because it results in higher expenditures for complex 
and costly services.  No State program at the present time appears to use deductibles, but at 
least one State uses coinsurance.22  Some States use premiums alone, others, copayments 
alone.  Only half of the 25 States with freestanding programs currently report the use of both 
premiums and copayments.23  
 
However, because even modest cost-sharing can affect entry into an insurance program 
or use of care,24 it is important to review the various means by which State programs may be 
able to lessen these effects.  Moreover, these mechanisms for reducing the burden of cost-
sharing for families with high-need children may take on additional importance if States elect to 
either increase their premiums and copayments or add deductibles.  Some of the design options 
reviewed below might aid even those families whose children’s average health needs 
nonetheless create a burden, because of the disjunction between the timing of the need and the 
annual framework against which  “excess” expenditures are to be measured under the law. 
 
 
                                               
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Markus, et al., op. cit. 
  
 
The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services  
Center for Health Services Research and Policy 
14 
 
The statute gives States the flexibility to heighten cost-sharing protections in two basic, 
but related, ways. The first involves strategies designed to reduce the actual dollar value of the 
cap, thereby making it easier for a low income family to reach the limit on cost-sharing.   The 
second entails strategies for decreasing the amount of time that it takes families to reach the 
cap.  
 
1.  Reducing the Dollar Value of the Five Percent Cap 
 
Under Federal law, the five percent cap is calculated in relation to family income.  Thus, 
if there is a decline in either the cap’s income percentage (set at five percent in the statute) or 
the family’s countable income as measured against the cap, then the dollar value of the cap 
would correspondingly decline.  The lower the cap, the more possible is its attainment by a 
greater number of families. 
 
a.  Calculating the cap on the basis of net rather than gross 
income 
 
The statute gives States the discretion to determine the methodology and standards that 
will be used to evaluate family income. The lower the income level resulting from this 
determination, the lower the value of a five percent cap.  
 
Take for example a family of four with $32,000 in annual income.  In a State that 
calculates the cap based on gross income (i.e., $32,000), then the family would have out-of-
pocket obligations of $1,600.  However, if the value of the cap is calculated based on the 
family’s actual take-home pay, minus additional deductions and disregards for child care and 
work expenses, then the dollar value of the cap would be significantly lower.  A family with gross 
income of $32,000 might have countable income of only $20,000 in a State that uses take-home 
pay as the basis for income that provides additional deductions for child care and work 
expenses. This would lower the dollar value of the family’s out-of-pocket obligations to $1,000.  
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b.  Offering an additional income deduction for medical and health 
costs not covered under the State CHIP plan 
 
 Federal law expresses the cap in relation to cost-sharing charges “imposed under the 
State child health plan.”25  Under this provision, only those costs that are incurred for medical 
and health care covered under the State plan count toward the cap. In States that offer more 
limited benefits (e.g., no dental care, no physical or speech therapy) or that place limits on 
certain benefits (e.g., only ten mental health outpatient visits annually), very high out-of-pocket 
costs, even for very sick children, would not count toward the cap if they are made for out-of-
plan expenditures.  However, were a State to create an additional deduction for uncovered 
medical expenditures (similar to the Federal income tax deduction for high medical costs or the 
deduction for expenditures outside the Medicaid plan that States use in calculating income 
eligibility for medically needy coverage),26 then such a deduction would provide significant 
financial benefits.  Moreover, a State could count these expenditures if incurred by a family (see 
discussion below), even if ultimately a third party (e.g., a State program for children with special 
health care needs) were to defray some of the cost. 
 
Consider again the example of a family with $32,000 in gross income and $20,000 in 
countable income. In a State that does not cover dental benefits and covers only limited mental 
health care, the family might be able to qualify for CHIP with a much lower cost-sharing burden 
if the State counted against available income the costs that the family incurs for dental care for 
its two children and for weekly therapy visits for its child with significant mental illness.  
 
c. Using a lower cap 
 
 The statute prohibits cost-sharing that exceeds five percent of the family’s “income for 
the year involved.”  In this respect, the law appears to create a ceiling rather than a floor.  
Nothing in the law suggests that Congress did not want States to have the discretion to set a 
lower cap; indeed, the cost-sharing provisions of the statute are notable for the flexibility they 
extend to States to tailor cost-sharing in a manner that meets their needs.   Thus, were a State  
                                               
25 Section 2103(e) of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(e) 
26 42 C.F.R. §435.811 
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to set its cost-sharing cap at a lower level (e.g., two percent), then the dollar value of the 
family’s outlay before the cap is triggered would be substantially lower.  At two percent, a family 
with countable income of $20,000 annually would need to incur only $400 before the cap is met.  
As in the above example, setting the cap at a lower threshold may be particularly important in 
States with child health assistance programs that cover only limited services, thereby leaving 
families with significant out-of-plan expenditures.  
 
2.  Accelerating the Point in the Year When the Cap is Met 
 
a. Permitting families to count incurred and projected expenditures 
toward services covered under the plan rather than only actual 
expenditures 
 
 The statute provides that “the total annual aggregate cost-sharing” for a family may not 
exceed five percent of such family’s income for the year.  The phrase “total annual aggregate 
cost-sharing” is broad and appears to give States the flexibility in calculating the cap to count 
expenditures that families incur (i.e., assume legal obligation for) even if not paid at the point-of-
service.27  Allowing the family to declare incurred but unpaid cost-sharing against the cap would 
allow the cap to be triggered at an earlier point in the year while permitting the family to repay 
incurred expenditures over time.  Going back to the earlier example of the family whose 
obligation is $1,600 for the year, if the family has a child with cerebral palsy who needs a costly 
wheel chair that is covered at only a 50 percent rate under the plan, then by using an 
“incurment” standard, the State would effectively ensure that the family will be deemed to have 
satisfied its cost-sharing obligation in that month alone, while having the remainder of the year 
to repay the cost.  
 
 Similarly, if the State allows a family to project costs for the year, then a family whose 
child is receiving expensive dental care covered at only a 50 percent rate could project the cost 
of coverage over the entire year and count its out-of-pocket payments for the course of 
treatment at the beginning of the year. 
                                               
27 The medically needy component of the Medicaid program permits families to count incurred expenses 
in calculating their spend-down liability. 42 C.F.R. §435.811. 
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b.  Permitting families to count retrospective expenditures 
 
The statute requires States to limit the cap to five percent of family income “for the year 
involved.”  Nothing in the statute appears to require States to calculate the “year involved” only 
on a prospective basis.  As a result, States appear to have the flexibility to permit families to 
apply toward the cap incurred bills for services covered under the State child health plan that 
were generated prior to the date of application.  Using a retroactive budgeting period, a family 
with high medical bills at the time of application could apply previously incurred bills toward its 
cost-sharing cap for the year, thereby reaching its annual limit at an earlier point in the 
enrollment process.28  
 
Taking the family of four used in the examples above, were the family to apply in 
January and have $5,000 in outstanding bills for the child’s dento-facial reconstruction already 
in hand, the State plan could permit the family to declare this bill as generated under the plan 
during the “year involved” by recognizing retroactive costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Three months’ retroactive eligibility is mandatory under Medicaid. Section 1902(a)(34) of the Act; 42 
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(34). 
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3.  Current State CHIP Cost-Sharing Practices 
 
In order to gauge the possible effects of current State CHIP programs on families with 
incomes above 150 percent of the Federal poverty level with different types of children, we 
developed five composite families, whose service utilization patterns are based on data from 
nationally representative surveys.29  These data show that, on average, children make three 
ambulatory care visits annually, and physicians prescribe one medication during those visits.  
They also show that children with chronic conditions average 16 visits per year, and, for the 
purpose of this analysis, we assume that physicians prescribed one medication during those 
visits.   We also developed a profile for an actual family, obtaining information on use and billing 
directly from the parent.  For the purpose of this discussion, each family is composed of a 
parent and one child, and has an annual income of $20,073 (the equivalent of 185 percent of 
the Federal poverty level for a family of two in 1998), which does not fluctuate during the year. 
The five percent cap places the family’s annual cost-sharing obligation at $1,004.  Box A below 
briefly describes each family. 
  
 
BOX A 
 
Composite family #1:  Child with occasional cold or ear infection 
In this family, the child is basically healthy, but is prone, like many children, to occasional colds and ear 
infections.  During the year, in addition to her regular checkups, she has two physician visits for colds. In 
addition, she has an ear infection accompanied by a very high fever, which takes her to the emergency 
room on a weekend evening.  Each time, she receives a prescription. 
 
Composite family #2:  Child with cerebral palsy 
In this family, the child has severe cerebral palsy, which requires ongoing services, including extensive 
physical and speech therapy and durable medical equipment, including a wheel chair.  In addition to two 
physician visits for colds and an emergency room visit for an ear infection, this child sees a physician 16 
times over the course of the year for monitoring related to his condition.  Sixteen different prescriptions 
must be filled, and the child is hospitalized once during the year for a complication arising from his 
condition. 
 
 
                                               
29 The average use per child was derived from the National Health Interview Survey, National Medical 
Expenditure Survey, National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, and National Hospital Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey.  Information on fees and charges was obtained from various other sources, which 
are not nationally representative. 
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Composite family #3:  Child with severe diabetes 
In this family, the child suffers from a severe case of diabetes, which requires ongoing care and results in 
one hospitalization. In addition to two physician visits for colds and an emergency room visit for an ear  
infection, this child sees a physician 16 times over the course of the year.  The child is given 16 separate 
prescriptions and is hospitalized once for surgery of a complication associated with the disease. 
 
Composite family #4: Child with catastrophic injury   
In this family, the child is seriously injured when she falls off her bike, which results in an inpatient 
admission for an intercranial hemorrhage, and extensive dental care for damage to the teeth and mouth.  
 
Composite family #5: Child with severe depression and alcohol dependency 
In this family, the child is severely depressed, and abuses alcohol to escape his depression, 
necessitating at least one inpatient stay at a mental health facility followed by 32 outpatient therapy 
sessions (16 for mental health and 16 for substance abuse).  At each mental health visit, the child 
receives a new prescription. 
 
Actual family:  Child with congenital heart disease 
In this family, the child was born with a congenital heart defect.  During the first year of her life, she 
receives three cardiology exams in addition to her regularly scheduled well-baby care visits.  In her 
second year of life (the coverage year in question), she sees the physician twice in two months for two 
ear infections, resulting in two prescriptions.  In addition, her cardiologist concludes that she should 
receive surgery for the heart condition.  An additional visit is made to obtain a second opinion. Prior to 
surgery, the child undergoes a pre-op physical exam, which includes laboratory and radiology services.  
The child’s successful surgery requires a five-day hospitalization followed by pain medication upon 
discharge, and a post-operative follow-up visit for an examination and wound check.  A month later, in an 
event unrelated to her operation, the child contracts pneumonia, and her mother takes her to the 
emergency room on a Sunday evening.  She leaves with a prescription, and goes to the doctor a week 
later for follow-up. 
 
 
 
We then compared the effect of three types of schedules currently found in CHIP 
plans—premiums only, cost-sharing only, and both premiums and cost-sharing—on our families’ 
out-of-pocket expenditures. Within each of the schedules, we selected two to three plans to 
provide a variety of benefit package and cost-sharing schedule design.  Since expenditures tend 
to be low under CHIP plans by design, we also contrasted them with expenses families would 
incur as a result of more extensive cost-sharing imposed under the Maryland State Employee 
and the Federal Employee Blue Cross/Blue Shield Preferred Provider Option.  For purposes of 
this hypothetical, we assume that State CHIP plans (and the State and Federal employee plans) 
cover the items and services needed by the children in our examples.  In fact, certain services, 
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particularly those for the child with cerebral palsy, might be completely uncovered under a 
State’s CHIP plan, in which case the family’s expenditures for these services would not count 
toward the cost-sharing cap for the reasons discussed in the previous section.30  Box B below 
summarizes selected States’ CHIP plan cost-sharing features. 
 
Table 1 (see p. 24) shows the results of applying States’ cost-sharing schedules 
displayed in Table 1a (see p. 28) and Federal and State employee cost-sharing schedules 
displayed in Table 1b (see p. 35) to the individual families described in Box A.  In no State does 
the family exceed its five percent cap. The only States in which exceeding the cap is possible 
are Massachusetts, when a family has access to employer coverage and therefore must abide 
by the cost-sharing requirements imposed under that coverage, and Utah, which uses 
coinsurance.  Excess cost-sharing would occur in the case of the child with the catastrophic 
injury in Massachusetts and the child with the congenital heart disease in Utah, but in these 
cases Massachusetts’s five percent cap and Utah’s $800 limit on cost-sharing act as a brake.   
By comparison, all families would incur aggregate expenses much above the five percent cap, 
were they enrolled in the Maryland State Employee Blue Cross Blue Shield PPO option or in the 
FEHBP Blue Cross Blue Shield standard PPO option. 
 
Similarly, in no State that imposes cost-sharing on families with incomes between 100 
and 150 percent of the Federal poverty level would families in that income bracket reach the 
cap.  For example, let’s apply the cost-sharing schedule of the Utah plan (i.e., $5 for use of the 
emergency room for emergent care, $10 for use of the emergency room for nonemergent care, 
$5 for office visits, and $2 for prescription drugs, with a $500 or five percent cap, whichever is 
lower) to our composite and actual families with a lower income of $14,431 (the equivalent of 
133 percent of the Federal poverty level).  These families would spend between .1 and 1 
percent of their income on copayments, well below the $500 (3.5 percent of income) or five 
percent ($721.55) cap.  
                                               
30 Private insurers commonly exclude as medically unnecessary or outside the scope of the contract 
otherwise covered items and services needed by children with congenital conditions from which a 
recovery cannot be expected. See Bedrick v Travelers Insurance Co.  93 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir., 1996). Such 
condition-based exclusions and limitations are unlawful under Medicaid and thus presumably would not 
be found in a State that enrolled CHIP children in an expanded Medicaid plan or that used coverage rules 
identical to Medicaid in its freestanding CHIP program.  
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BOX B 
 
Premiums, no cost-sharing: Maine, Michigan (Massachusetts*) 
Several States (e.g., Maine and Michigan) limit cost-sharing for families with incomes above 150 percent of 
the Federal poverty level to premiums only.  For example, Maine, under Cub Care, the State’s separate 
CHIP program, offers a Medicaid “look-alike” benefit package to children between 1 and 18 years old with 
family incomes between 150 and 185 percent of the Federal poverty level. The premium is set so as not to 
exceed 1.6 percent of family income.31  Another example is Michigan, which offers benefits similar to those 
of the State Employee Plan with mental health parity for a $5 monthly premium.  
 
No premiums, cost-sharing: Arizona, Utah   
Arizona and Utah have opted for cost-sharing (but against premiums) for families with incomes above 150 
percent of the Federal poverty level, although the actual levels of cost-sharing vary.  While Arizona’s only 
cost-sharing requirement is a $5 fee for emergency room use, Utah, on the other hand, has an elaborate 
coinsurance and copayment schedule, which also caps total out-of-pocket payments at $800 per family per 
year.32  Both States also impose cost-sharing on families with incomes below 150 percent of the Federal 
poverty level. 
 
Premiums and cost-sharing: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware (Massachusetts*) 
Families with incomes above 150 percent of the Federal poverty level in States such as Alabama, 
Colorado, and Delaware are required to pay both premiums and copayments.  For example, the Delaware 
Healthy Children’s Program covers children under age 19 in families with incomes up to 200 percent of the 
Federal poverty level.  Families must pay a premium; however, once enrolled, families pay copayments 
only for emergency room services.  Dental services are excluded from the Delaware package.   The 
Alabama plan requires a $50 annual premium for families with incomes above the 150 percent level 
capped at $150 per family (or, if paid in installments, $6 per child for ten months for a total of $60 per child 
annually capped at $180 per family), uses some cost-sharing for services, and caps the cost-sharing 
obligation at  $500 annually.33 Colorado charges an adjusted premium for children enrolled in its CHIP 
program with cost-sharing for enrolled families.  The State does not include a dollar cap, as is the case in 
Alabama and Utah.34 
 
*  Massachusetts offers two alternatives: if the family has access to employer-based coverage, then cost-sharing 
imposed under such coverage applies (except for well-baby and well-child care); if the family does not have access to 
employer-based coverage, then the family is exempt from cost-sharing. Premiums apply in both cases. 
 
 
  
                                               
31 How are States implementing children’s health insurance plans?, op. cit.  
32Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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Comparatively, as Table 1 shows, our Utahn families with a higher income would spend 
between .3 and 9.7 percent of their income on out-of-pocket costs, not only because cost-
sharing in that income bracket applies to a higher number of services (e.g., mental health and 
substance abuse services), but also because it takes the form of coinsurance, which results in 
higher expenditures for complex and costly services (e.g., cardiovascular surgery).
  
 
The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services  
Center for Health Services Research and Policy 
23 
 
C.  Implications of State Efforts to Reduce Cost-sharing Burdens 
 
 The discussion in the previous subsection suggests that at the present time, families 
may not face excess burdens in the 17 States whose CHIP plans can be expected to enroll 
children who are subject to the cap. Nonetheless, States may conclude that increasing 
premiums and cost-sharing or offering premium assistance to families with access to employer-
based coverage, which is notable for having higher cost-sharing arrangements, may be 
desirable.  The options for limiting cost-sharing exposure for families that are reviewed in 
Section B would help shield families, even families whose children are average health care 
users, from high costs.  
 
 However, these strategies, if pursued, have important implications for the design of 
freestanding State CHIP plans. At the present time, enrollment in freestanding programs is 
relatively low, a result that is not unexpected at the beginning of a new program.  However, 
relatively generous policies that reduce or eliminate families’ cost-sharing burdens could 
increase utilization and encourage greater enrollment by families whose children have chronic 
health care needs.  Under these circumstances, the actuarial assumptions on which the State’s 
premiums are based could be significantly affected.  In States in which coverage for CHIP 
children is purchased through a larger pool (e.g., the State employee plan or the Medicaid 
managed care program), the additional assistance for low income families with sick children 
might have only a very slight effect on the overall premium.  However, the effect could be more 
pronounced in States that buy coverage for CHIP children on a freestanding basis.   
 
Thus, were a State with a freestanding program of limited size to elect to take advantage 
of one or more options for reducing the cost-sharing obligations of lower income families, it 
would have to consider the actuarial implications of these design modifications.  Were these 
implications not taken into account, a State might experience market pull-out by plans or 
attempts to severely limit utilization through other means in order to offset the utilization 
enhancing effects of removing cost-sharing barriers. 
TABLE 1
HOW MUCH DOES A FAMILY OF TWO AT 185 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL SPEND YEARLY ON PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING
UNDER VARIOUS CHIP PLANS, A STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN, AND A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN?
(As a percentage of annual income, i.e., $20,073, and, in parentheses, as a ratio to the five percent cap, i.e. $1,004)
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 24
Type of
schedule
Type of plan Child with
occasional
cold or ear
infection
(composite
family #1)
Child with
cerebral
palsy
(composit
e family
#2)
Child with
severe
diabetes
(composite
family #3)
Child with
catastrophic
injury
(composite
family #4)
Child with
serious
mental
illness
(composite
family #5)
Child with
congenital
heart diesease
(actual family)
No premiums/
No cost-
sharing
Sample CHIP
plans
VA, OR 0%
(0)
0%
(0)
0%
(0)
0%
(0)
0%
(0)
0%
(0)
AZ .02%
(.004)
.02%
(.004)
.02%
(.004)
.02%
(.004)
.02%
(.004)
.02%
(.004)
No premiums/
Cost-sharing
Sample CHIP
plans
UT
[Cap= 5% or
$800 (3.9%),
whichever is
lower]
.3%
(.06)
2.8%
(.55)
2.8%
(.55)
1.9%
(.37)
4.7%
(.94)
9.7%
(1.94)
ME .9%
(.17)
.9%
(.17)
.9%
(.17)
.9%
(.17)
.9%
(.17)
.9%
(.17)
Premiums/
No cost-
sharing
Sample CHIP
plans
MI .3%
(.05)
.3%
(.05)
.3%
(.05)
.3%
(.05)
.3%
(.05)
.3%
(.05)
Premiums/
Cost-sharing
Sample CHIP
plans
AL
[Cap= $500
(2.4%)]
.3%
(.06)
1.1%
(.21)
1.1%
(.21)
.5%
(.09)
.4%
(.08)
.6%
(.11)
TABLE 1
HOW MUCH DOES A FAMILY OF TWO AT 185 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL SPEND YEARLY ON PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING
UNDER VARIOUS CHIP PLANS, A STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN, AND A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN?
(As a percentage of annual income, i.e., $20,073, and, in parentheses, as a ratio to the five percent cap, i.e. $1,004)
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 25
Type of
schedule
Type of plan Child with
occasional
cold or ear
infection
(composite
family #1)
Child with
cerebral
palsy
(composit
e family
#2)
Child with
severe
diabetes
(composite
family #3)
Child with
catastrophic
injury
(composite
family #4)
Child with
serious
mental
illness
(composite
family #5)
Child with
congenital
heart diesease
(actual family)
CO 1.3%
(.26)
2.2%
(.43)
2.2%
(.43)
3.8%
(.27, excluding
dental costs)
(.76, if dental
costs counted
toward CM)
1.6%
(.31)
1.5%
(.30)
DE 1.5%
(.30)
1.5%
(.30)
1.5%
(.30)
3.9%
(.30, excluding
dental costs)
(.76, if dental
costs counted
toward CM)
1.5%
(.30)
1.5%
(.30)
Type of
schedule
Type of plan Child with
occasional
cold or ear
infection
(composite
family #1)
Child with
cerebral
palsy
(composit
e family
#2)
Child with
severe
diabetes
(composite
family #3)
Child with
catastrophic
injury
(composite
family #4)
Child with
serious
mental
illness
(composite
family #5)
Child with
congenital
heart
diesease
(actual family)
TABLE 1
HOW MUCH DOES A FAMILY OF TWO AT 185 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL SPEND YEARLY ON PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING
UNDER VARIOUS CHIP PLANS, A STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN, AND A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN?
(As a percentage of annual income, i.e., $20,073, and, in parentheses, as a ratio to the five percent cap, i.e. $1,004)
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 26
Type of
schedule
Type of plan Child with
occasional
cold or ear
infection
(composite
family #1)
Child with
cerebral
palsy
(composit
e family
#2)
Child with
severe
diabetes
(composite
family #3)
Child with
catastrophic
injury
(composite
family #4)
Child with
serious
mental
illness
(composite
family #5)
Child with
congenital
heart
diesease
(actual family)
MA
No access to
employer
coverage
=> no cost-
sharing
.6%
(.11)
.6%
(.11)
.6%
(.11)
.6%
(.11)
.6%
(.11)
.6%
(.11)
Premiums/
No cost-
sharing
 or
Premiums/
Cost-sharing
Sample CHIP
plans
MA
Access to
employer
coverage
(e.g., GWUHP
standard
HMO option)
=> cost-
sharing
applies
[Cap=5%]
1.1%
(.22)
4.1%
(.81)
4.1%
(.81)
5.4%
(1.07)
4.7%
(.93)
2.6%
(.51)
TABLE 1
HOW MUCH DOES A FAMILY OF TWO AT 185 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL SPEND YEARLY ON PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING
UNDER VARIOUS CHIP PLANS, A STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN, AND A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN?
(As a percentage of annual income, i.e., $20,073, and, in parentheses, as a ratio to the five percent cap, i.e. $1,004)
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 27
Type of
schedule
Type of plan Child with
occasional
cold or ear
infection
(composite
family #1)
Child with
cerebral
palsy
(composit
e family
#2)
Child with
severe
diabetes
(composite
family #3)
Child with
catastrophic
injury
(composite
family #4)
Child with
serious
mental
illness
(composite
family #5)
Child with
congenital
heart
diesease
(actual family)
State employee
 plan
Maryland
BCBS
PPO option
5.7%
(1.09,
excluding Rx
costs)
(1.14, if Rx
costs counted
toward CM)
8.8%
(1.45,
excluding
Rx costs)
(1.75, if Rx
costs
counted
toward CM)
8.8%
(1.45,
excluding
Rx costs)
(1.75, if Rx
costs
counted
toward CM)
8.4%
(1.13,
excluding
dental and Rx
costs)
(1.68, if dental
and Rx costs
counted
toward CM)
11.9%
(2.08,
excluding Rx
costs)
(2.38, if Rx
costs
counted
toward CM)
6.4%
(1.24,
excluding Rx
costs)
(1.28, if Rx
costs counted
toward CM)
Premiums/
Cost-sharing
Federal employee
health benefit plan
BCBS
standard
PPO option
[Cap=$2,000
(9.9%)]
8.9%
(1.77)
12.3%
(2.46)
12.3%
(2.46)
11.9%
(2.39)
22.8%
(4.55)
15.20%
(3.03)
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 28
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
Child
with
occasion
al cold
or ear
infection
(compos
ite #1)
Routine care:
2  MD visits
(colds)
1  ER visit
(otitis)
3  Rx drugs
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
0
0
0
0
$5
0
$10 x 2
$30
$4 x 33
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$1 x 34
$5 x 2
$6
$3 x 34
0
$10
0
$10 x 2
$50
$35 + $5
0
0
0
Child Routine care:
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 29
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
with
cerebral
palsy
(compos
ite #2)
2  MD visits
(colds)
1  ER visit
(otitis)
3  Rx drugs
Care for
condition:
16 MD visits
16 Rx drugs
1   5-day hosp.
54, 36a
88b
16c
54, 36x15a
16c
581/dayd
1,800a
120a
41a
90
88
48
594
256
2,905
1,800
120
41
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 2
$30
$4 x 33
$10 x 16
50%($256-25%)
10%($2,905-
25%)
0
$10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$1 x 34
$5 x 16
$1 x 164
$5
0
$5
$5
$5 x 2
$6
$3 x 34
$5 x 16
$3 x 164
0
0
$5
$5
0
$10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 2
$50
$35 + $5
$20 x 16
$5 x 16
$150
0
$20
$20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 30
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
stay,
     plus 1
surgery
1  pre-op MD
visit
1  follow-up MD
visit
$10
Child
with
severe
Routine care:
2  MD visits
(colds)
1  ER visit
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
0
0
0
0
$5
0
$10 x 2
$30
$4 x 33
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$1 x 34
$5 x 2
$6
$3 x 34
0
$10
0
$10 x 2
$50
$35 + $5
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 31
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
diabetes
(compos
ite #3)
(otitis)
3  Rx drugs
Care for
condition:
16 MD visits
16 Rx drugs
1   5-day hosp.
stay,
     plus 1
surgery
54, 36x15a
16c
581/dayd
1,800a
120a
41a
594
256
2,905
1,800
120
41
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 16
50%($256-25%)
10%($2,905-
25%)
0
$10
$10
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5 x 16
$1 x 164
$5
0
$5
$5
$5 x 16
$3 x 164
0
0
$5
$5
0
0
0
0
0
0
$20 x 16
$5 x 16
$150
0
$20
$20
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 32
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
1  pre-op MD
visit
1  follow-up MD
visit
Child
with
catastro-
phic
injury
(compos
Routine care:
2  MD visits
(colds)
1  ER visit
(otitis)
3  Rx drugs
54, 36a
88b
16c
581/dayd
90
88
48
2,905
0
0
0
0
0
$5
0
0
$10 x 2
$30
$4 x 33
10%($2,905-
0
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$1 x 34
$5
$5 x 2
$6
$3 x 34
0
0
$10
0
0
$10 x 2
$50
$35 + $5
$150
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 33
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
ite #4) Care for
condition:
1  5-day hosp.
stay,
    plus 1 surgery
1  pre-op MD
visit
1  follow-up MD
visit
1  Rx drug
2  dental visits
3,276a
120a
41a
16c
14e
230f
3,276
120
41
16
28
460
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25%)
0
$10
$10
$43
0
20%($460-25%)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5
$5
$14
$5 x 2
0
0
$5
$5
$34
$28
$460
0
0
0
0
$28
$460
0
$20
$20
$5
$5 x 2
$320 x 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 34
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
2  crowns
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 35
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
Child
with
serious
mental
illness
(compos
ite #5)
Routine care:
2  MD visits
(colds)
1  ER visit
(otitis)
3  Rx drugs
Care for
condition:
16 outpt. MH
visits
16 outpt. SA
visits
16 Rx drugs
1   4-day MH
stay
54, 36a
88b
16c
131,
101x15a
131,
101x15a
16c
581/dayd
90
88
48
1,646
1,646
256
2,324
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 2
$30
$4 x 33
50%($1,646-
25%)
0
50%($256-25%)
10%($2,324-
25%)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$1 x 34
0
0
$1 x 164
0
$5 x 2
$6
$3 x 34
0
0
$3 x 164
0
0
$10
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 2
$50
$35 + $5
$20 x 16
$10 x 16
$5 x 16
$150
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 36
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
Child
with
congenit
al
heart
defect
(actual
case)
Routine care:
2 MD visits*
2  Rx drugs*
1 ER visit**
1  Rx drug**
1  MD visit**
*    (otitis media)
* *  (pneumonia)
Care for
54, 36a
3.95g
88b
25.16g
36a
90
7.90
88
25.16
36
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5
0
0
$10 x 2
$4 x 23
$30
$4 x 13
$10
0
0
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$1 x 24
$5
$14
$5
$5 x 2
$3 x 24
$6
$34
$5
0
0
$10
0
0
$10 x 2
$7.90
$50
$25.16
$10
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 37
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
condition:
2  MD visits
(cardiol.)
1  MD visit
(ped.)
2  MD visits
(surg.)
1  5-day hosp.
stay,
    plus 1 surgery
1  Rx drug
110, 50a
36a
120a
24,047.4
9
17,785
4.68g
120a
41a
160
36
240
24,047.
49
17,785
4.68
120
41
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$10 x 2
$10
$10 x 2
10%($24,047.49-
25%)
0
$43
$10
$10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$5 x 2
$5
$5 x 2
$5
0
$14
$5
$5
$5 x 2
$5
$5 x 2
0
0
$34
$5
$5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$20 x 2
$10
$20 x 2
$150
0
$1.94 + $5
$20
$20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 1a
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED CHIP PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 38
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected CHIP plans1
MAVA
O
R
A
Z
UT ME
MI
AL CO DE
Access to
employer
coverage2
No access
to employer
coverage
Premiums
No
No
N
o
No $15 x 
12
  $5 x
12
$50/yea
r
$20 x
12
$25 x
12
$10 x 12 $10 x 12
Profile Annual average
use  (excludes
well-child care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
1  pre-op MD
visit
1  follow-up MD
visit
TABLE 1a
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1. Information comes from various sources, including: Health Care Financing Administration.  (1998) Fact sheets.  At
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2. Uses the GWU Health Plan’s Standard HMO Option as an example of employer coverage to illustrate the type of cost-sharing that could be
required under such coverage.  This policy includes a $35 per family deductible for pharmaceutical services and an annual cost-sharing 
cap, which varies by region and excludes durable medical equipment and substance abuse inpatient expenses (however, for the purpose 
of this exercise, expenditures for premiums and cost-sharing for services covered under the plan are counted toward the cumulative 
maximum, which is capped at five percent of income).
3. Assumes the use of prescription drugs on approved list (a coinsurance rate of 50 percent of allowed amount applies to unapproved drugs).
4. Assumes the use of generic prescription drugs (brand names are $3 in Alabama and $5 in Colorado).
a. Kirchner, M. (1990) Where do your fees fit in?  Medical Economics, pp. 76-105, October 1.
b. Federal Register. (1998)  Vol. 63, No. 211, pp. 58596-58897, November 2 (Total physician payment for selected procedures under 
Medicare)
c. Hong, S.H., and Shepherd, M.D. (1996) Outpatient prescription drug use by children enrolled in five drug benefit plans. Clinical 
Therapeutics, Vol. 18, No.3, pp. 528-545.
d. Newacheck, P.W., and Taylor, W.R.  Childhood chronic illness: Prevalence, severity, and impact.  American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 
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e. Complete schedule of dental allowances, Standard Option Blue Cross and Blue Shield Service Benefit Plan, Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program, 1999.
f. 1999 Summary of Maryland State Employees Health Benefits.
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TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 35
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
Child
with
occasion
al cold or
ear
infection
(composi
te #1)
Routine care:
2  M.D. visits (colds)
1  ER visit (otitis media)
3  Rx drugs
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
$15 x 2
50%($88)
$48
$12 x 2
$88
$48
Child
with
cerebral
palsy
(composi
Routine care:
2  M.D. visits (colds)
1  ER visit (otitis media)
3  Rx drugs
Care for condition:
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
$15 x 2
50%($88)
48
$12 x 2
$88
$48
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 36
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
te #2) 16 M.D. visits
16 Rx drugs
1  five-day hospital stay,
    plus 1 surgery
1  pre-op M.D. visit
1  follow-up M.D. visit
54, 36x15a
16c
581/dayd
1,800a
120a
41a
594
256
2,905
1,800
120
41
$20 x 16
$256
0
0
$20
$20
$12 x 16
$52 + 20%($204)
0
$312 + 5%($1,488)
$12
$12
Note: To simplify calculations, $400
deductible
applied to ER and surgery.
Child
with
severe
diabetes
(composi
Routine care:
2  M.D. visits (colds)
1  ER visit (otitis media)
3  Rx drugs
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
$15 x 2
50%($88)
48
$12 x 2
$88
$48
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 37
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
te #3) Care for condition:
16 M.D. visits
16 Rx drugs
1  five-day hospital stay,
    plus 1 surgery
1  pre-op M.D. visit
1  follow-up M.D. visit
54, 36x15a
16c
581/dayd
1,800a
120a
41a
594
256
2,905
1,800
120
41
$20 x 16
$256
0
0
$20
$20
$12 x 16
$52 + 20%($204)
0
$312 + 5%($1,488)
$12
$12
Note: To simplify calculations, $400
deductible
applied to ER and surgery.
Child
with
catastro-
phic
Routine care:
2  M.D. visits (colds)
1  ER visit (otitis media)
3  Rx drugs
54, 36a
88b
16c
90
88
48
$15 x 2
50%($88)
48
$12 x 2
$88
$48
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 38
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
injury
(composi
te #4)
Care for condition:
1  five-day hospital stay,
   plus 1 surgery
1  pre-op M.D. visit
1  follow-up M.D. visit
1  Rx drug
2  follow-up dental visits
2  crowns
581/dayd
3,276a
120a
41a
16c
14e
230f
2,905
3,276
120
41
16
28
460
0
0
$20
$20
$16
$28
$460
0
$312 + 5%($2,964)
$12
$12
$16
25%($28)
25%($460)
Note: To simplify calculations, $400
deductible
applied to ER and surgery.
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 39
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
Child
with
serious
mental
illness
(composi
te #5)
Routine care:
2  M.D. visits (colds)
1  ER visit (otitis media)
3  Rx drugs
Care for condition:
16 outpatient MH visits
16 outpatient SA visits
16 Rx drugs
1  four-day MH stay
54, 36a
88b
16c
131,
101x15a
131,
101x15a
16c
581/dayd
90
88
48
1,646
1,646
256
2,324
$15 x 2
50%($88)
$48
20%($535) + 35%($1,111)
20%($535) + 35%($1,111)
$256
0
$12 x 2
$88
$48
$312 + 60%($1,334)
60%($1,646)
$52 + 20%($204)
$150 x 4
Note: To simplify calculations, $400
deductible
applied to ER and MH visits.
Child Routine care:
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 40
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
with
congenit
al
heart
defect
(actual
case)
2  M.D. visits (otitis)
2  Rx drugs (otitis)
1  ER visit (pneumonia)
1  Rx drug (pneumonia)
1  M.D. visit
(pneumonia)
Care for condition:
2  M.D. visits
(cardiology)
1  M.D. visit (pediatry)
2  M.D. visits (surgery)
1  five-day hospital stay,
    plus 1 surgery
1  Rx drug
1  pre-op M.D. visit
54, 36a
3.95g
88b
25.16g
36a
110, 50a
36a
120a
24,047.4
9
17,785
4.68g
120a
41a
90
7.90
88
25.16
36
160
36
240
24,047.
49
17,785
4.68
120
41
$15 x 2
$7.90
50%($88)
$25.16
$15
$20 x 2
$15
$20 x 2
0
0
$4.68
$20
$20
$12 x 2
$7.90
$88
$25.16
$12
$12 x 2
$12
$12 x 2
0
$312 + 5%($17,473)
$4.68
$12
$12
TABLE 1b
WHAT PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING ARE APPLICABLE TO PROTOTYPE FAMILIES WITH INCOMES ABOVE 150 PERCENT OF THE  FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL
UNDER SELECTED STATE EMPLOYEE AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PLANS?
Source: Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 1999. 41
Average annual
cost
Applicable premiums and cost-sharing  under selected
state employee and federal employee plans
Maryland State Employee
Plan:
BCBS PPO Option1
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan:
BCBS standard PPO Option2
Premiums
$85.53 x 12 for 2 people $135.03 x 12  for self and child
Profile Annual average use 
(excludes well-child
care)
Per unit
($)
Total
($)
Cost-sharing
1  follow-up M.D. visit Note: To simplify calculations, $400
deductible
applied to ER and surgery.
TABLE 1b
References
                                                
1. Source:  1999 Summary of Maryland State Employees Health Benefits.
2. Source:  Blue Cross and Blue Shield Service Benefit Plan, Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 1999.   Assumes use
of preferred providers only.  This policy also includes a $400 and $100 per family deductible for medical and pharmaceutical services,
respectively, and an annual cost-sharing cap of $2,000 per family that excludes mental health and substance abuse as well as dental
expenses (however, in order to replicate most states’ policy, out-of-pocket expenditures resulting from premiums and cost-sharing for all
42
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
services covered under the plan are counted toward the cumulative maximum).  The coinsurance percentage is calculated on the billed or
allowable charge, whichever is less.
a. Kirchner, M. (1990) Where do your fees fit in?  Medical Economics, pp. 76-105, October 1.
b. Federal Register. (1998)  Vol. 63, No. 211, pp. 58596-58897, November 2 (Total physician payment for selected procedures under 
Medicare).
c. Hong, S.H., and Shepherd, M.D. (1996) Outpatient prescription drug use by children enrolled in five drug benefit plans.  Clinical 
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Part Three. MECHANISMS TO MORE EFFECTIVELY 
TRACK FAMILY EXPENDITURES TOWARD 
THE FIVE PERCENT CAP 
 
 
 When we asked State CHIP officials about how their State tracked out-of-pocket 
expenditures to ensure that families do not pay in excess of five percent of their income, we 
found that many States did not expect families to reach the cap because of the very low level at 
which cost-sharing was set.  (See Table B, pp. 42-43.)  We also found that States adopted one 
of two strategies, both of which are an adaptation of the “shoebox” approach also commonly 
used by private insurers: 
 
• The State Medicaid agency communicates to each family the amount of the five percent 
cap in dollars.  The family then keeps track of its expenditures.  When it reaches the cap, 
the family sends the paperwork to the State, which either issues a notification letter or 
sticker to be placed on the membership card indicating that cost-sharing may no longer 
be imposed.  At the next physician visit, the family shows the letter or the sticker to the 
provider to avoid payment. 
 
• The State Medicaid agency communicates to each participating plan the amount of each 
member’s five percent cap in dollars.  The family then keeps track of its expenditures.  
When it reaches the cap, the family sends the paperwork to the health plan, which 
issues a notification letter indicating that cost-sharing may no longer be imposed.  At the 
next physician visit, the family shows the letter to the provider to avoid payment. 
 
While the “shoebox” approach appears to be the favored option at present time, it places 
the primary burden for tracking expenditures on the family, for whom it might be a difficult task 
because of other priorities or worries taking precedence.  In examining other approaches to 
tracking family cost-sharing expenditures that count toward the five percent cap, we developed 
three main options that States might wish to consider: a “swipe card” approach, a “credit card” 
approach, and a “case manager” approach. 
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TABLE B: How do States with separate CHIP programs track the five percent  
cumulative maximum? 
 
  
Tracking System 
AL Families keep receipts of expenses.  Once the $500 cap has been reached, families must have 
the necessary documentation to stop cost-sharing as well as reclaim any overpaid expenses. 
AZ Health plans will include a statement in the Member Handbook explaining to families that they 
can call AHCCCS when copayments exceed the five percent of income limit, and stop paying 
the copayments. State officials do not expect these limits to be reached (e.g., it would take 
someone at 150 percent of the federal poverty level 162 non-emergency visits per year to the 
emergency room to reach the limit). 
CA Families track and account for expenditures, and seek reimbursement from the State if the five 
percent maximum is exceeded. 
CO Families track and account for expenditures, and seek reimbursement from the State if the five 
percent maximum is exceeded.  Once the cap is reached, a sticker is put on the membership 
card to indicate that the family cannot be charged any longer for cost-sharing. 
CT Plans monitor and enforce the five percent maximum, and notify enrollees and providers when 
the cap is reached. 
DE Delaware officials do not expect families to reach the five percent cost-sharing cap.  They do 
not envision a proactive monitoring system.  They plan to act as problems arise.  Delaware 
does not have a Medicaid cost-sharing system at all. 
FL Families track and account for expenditures, and notify the State when the five percent 
maximum is reached.  Families will then receive a letter from the State that exempts them from 
cost-sharing. 
GA Georgia officials do not expect families to reach the cost-sharing cap. They do not envision a 
proactive monitoring system.  They plan to act as problems arise. 
KS Kansas officials do not expect to reach the five percent limit because of the limited cost-sharing 
measures. 
KY The State will determine the five percent cap for families with incomes above 150 percent of the 
federal poverty level.  The managed care entities participating in the program will track each 
family’s out-of-pocket expenses, which include premiums and copayments, and establish a 
provider notification procedure when a family has reached its annual out-of-pocket limit.  
ME Maine officials do not expect families to reach the cost-sharing cap. They do not envision a 
proactive monitoring system, planning to act as problems arise.  They only expect a cap 
problem, if they have to increase premium amounts. 
MA Annual premiums do not exceed five percent of family income for direct coverage.  For premium 
assistance programs, the State will notify the family of its five percent cap.  The family is 
responsible for tracking expenditures and submitting bills for payment.  Once a famiy has 
reached the cap, it must submit proof to the State.  The family will then be billed by providers 
and submit the bill directly to the State.  The State will pay the family within two weeks. 
MI Michigan officials do not expect families to reach the cost-sharing cap. They do not envision a 
proactive monitoring system, and plan to act when problems arise. 
MS Mississippi will not impose cost-sharing.  However, the State has a procedure in place for 
families that have access to employer-based coverage to prevent them from paying cost-
sharing imposed under such coverage, and will accept claims from providers for co-payments, 
deductibles, and premiums imposed under such coverage.  
MT Each time a claim is paid, the insurer will send to the family an explanation of benefits that 
specifies the amount of copayments that have been incurred during the year.  Once a family 
reaches the limit, it can use the explanation of benefits to show providers that it is exempt from 
copayments.  If a family exceeds the limit, it may contact the State for a refund. 
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Tracking System 
NV Nevada officials do not expect to reach the five percent limit because of the limited cost-sharing 
measures.  The State will waive cost-sharing fees for families who cannot afford them. 
NH A mechanism will be implemented to ensure that cost-sharing for a family will not exceed five 
percent of the family income for a year. The family will be educated on the amount of its limit, 
how to track cost-sharing, and how to contact the State once it equals or exceeds the limit. The 
family will receive a letter from the State notifying the family that cost-sharing will cease for the 
remainder of the current 12 month eligibility period. 
NJ Families will be given written materials that explain the issue of the cap.  They must track cost-
sharing amounts paid.  Once the cap is reached, families must notify the State.  The State will 
provide the family with a letter that informs providers that the family is exempt from copayments. 
NY Families must notify insurers when the five percent cap has been reached.  Once it has been 
determined through documentation, no further cost-sharing is required.  The Department of 
Health has reviewed the cost-sharing requirements for each family size and income level to 
ensure that in no instance will the cost-sharing requirement exceed five percent of a family’s 
annual income for the relevant year.  The method for ensuring that the aggregate cost-sharing 
for a family does not exceed five percent of such family’s annual income is based on a 
comparison of the maximum gross household income, by percent of federal poverty level, to the 
maximum contribution a family may be asked to contribute to participate in the program.   
NC North Carolina’s CHIP health plan will be offered through the North Carolina Teachers' and 
State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (TSECMMP), and run by Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield. The Division of Medical Assistance through the Eligibility Information System will notify 
TSECMMP of the cost-sharing limit.  A computer system will keep track of claims and will 
generate a letter when the family reaches its cost-sharing limits.  The family can use the 
notification to show providers that they should stop imposing any cost-sharing.  The plan states: 
“The type and amount of co-payment is set at levels that are extremely unlikely to exceed the 
upper limit … [but] as a precaution … a report will be generated annually that lists income levels 
for individuals for whom co-payment amount exceeds 5% of 100% of annual federal poverty 
guidelines for an individual. This assures that the lowest possible annual income for a Title XXI 
eligible is the threshold.”  North Carolina has no Medicaid cost-sharing program.  
OR Oregon’s plan does not include any cost-sharing elements, so State officials are not concerned 
with exceeding the five percent cost-sharing limit. 
PA Pennsylvania officials are not concerned with families reaching the five percent limit because 
the State plan does not include any cost-sharing elements. 
UT The State will provide a quarterly report to families on out-of-pocket expenses incurred. 
Providers will be notified when a family has reached its out-of-pocket maximum. If a family 
incurs expenses that exceed the out-of-pocket maximum, the State will reimburse the family. 
VT Under the Vermont plan, the managed care plans will track copayment amounts for medical 
services and the Medicaid MMIS will track these amounts for dental services.  When the bill is 
paid to the provider, the family will receive a notice that includes the amount of the copayment 
that was applied to the counter.  If the cap has been reached, the notice will indicate that no 
payment is due. 
VA Virginia will not impose cost-sharing. The State plans to amend its CHIP proposal to include 
cost-sharing for enrollees between 150-185 percent of the federal poverty level, and will deal 
with tracking issues then. 
 
 
Source: CHPR telephone conversations with State CHIP officials, September-October 
1998; HCFA fact sheets, http://www.hcfa.gov/init, as of February 1999.  
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A. “Swipe Card” Approach 
 
The first approach States might want to consider is a “swipe card” approach.  Where 
swipe card technology is in use, a participating provider obtains, through a “swiping” device 
provided to the provider by the plan, on-site verification of the amount owed under the enrollee’s 
plan, as well as confirmation regarding whether or not the family has satisfied its exposure for 
the year.35 
 
This option was favored by representatives of several health plans that offer products, 
which include cumulative maximum protections against excessive cost-sharing, with whom we 
discussed the options available to track family cost-sharing expenditures that count toward the 
five percent cap.36  The individuals interviewed made a series of important observations.  
 
First, each pointed out that the plan could track only those expenditures that were made 
for services covered under its contract.  They correctly observed that no company would be able 
or willing to attempt to track services for extra-contractual services and benefits.   This point has 
a logical consistency with the structure of the statute’s cost-sharing protections which, as noted 
in the previous part, are limited to items and services that are covered under the State CHIP 
plan.  It might be that, as in Medicaid, some States may opt to cover more services under their 
CHIP plans than they include in their contracts with participating insurance companies.  This  
tendency to cover more in the CHIP plan than in the insurance contracts might be particularly 
true in the case of services for children with chronic care needs.  Given the unwillingness of  
plans to track extra-contractual services, under these circumstances, a State would have to  
track two categories of expenditures: those for services in its plan, and those for services in its 
contracts. 
 
                                               
35 The percentage of health plans and providers with this technology is unknown.  Aetna U.S. HealthCare 
and Cigna, for example, advertise the use of such technology.  According to Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Association representatives, “some” BCBS plans use smart cards, but this information is largely 
anecdotal.  Finally, a dozen states (e.g., Maryland) use a similar technology, known as Electronic Benefits 
Transfer, in their welfare programs for cash and food stamp benefits. 
36 Neither we nor officials in HCFA with whom we spoke were aware of any State that had elected to use 
a cumulative maximum amount in its Medicaid cost-sharing program. We therefore could not identify any 
State Medicaid prototypes. 
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Second, plan spokespersons observed that, while the technology for tracking cumulative 
maximum cost-sharing does exist in the form of swipe cards that could be presented at 
participating network providers, a swipe card system could be used under CHIP only if a State 
translated into actual dollar figures the cost-sharing cap applicable to families (as Utah, 
Kentucky, and Alabama appear to do).  Plans were (not surprisingly) unwilling to consider 
administering a system under which each family would have a different cost-sharing obligation 
depending on its annual income.  However, were States to follow the Utah, Kentucky, and 
Alabama dollar limit models for cost-sharing upper limits, then existing swipe card technology 
would appear to be workable.  In purchasing plan coverage, States could include as a contract 
specification a requirement that participating plans have the technology in place to allow them to 
track and apply a cumulative maximum dollar limitation.  States that provide direct coverage 
under CHIP and do not buy insurance could of course purchase such technology for their own 
programs.  
 
B. “Credit Card” Approach 
 
 A variant on the swipe card approach is the nonautomated “credit card” approach, 
which, unlike swipe card technology, does not necessarily rely on electronic transmission of 
information.  The State would issue a credit card to each family, who would present it to the 
provider at the point-of-service.  The provider would call a telephone number to seek 
authorization of payment from the State.  The State would, directly or through participating 
health plans, pay the provider for services furnished and obtain reimbursement of copayments 
directly from the family. 
 
 Such an approach has two main advantages.  First, it eliminates the administrative 
burden of collecting cost-sharing obligations at the point-of-service.  Second, families would be 
able to pay back what they owe to the State over time, thereby lessening the financial impact 
they might feel from cost-sharing imposed at the time of service.   
 
This approach also has two main disadvantages.  While it eliminates the need for point-
of-service collection, it generates other administrative barriers, such as the creation of an 
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authorization process.  In addition, the expected deterrent effect of point-of-service collection of 
cost-sharing payments on use of services—one of cost-sharing’s rationales—is completely lost. 
 
C. “Case Manager” Approach 
 
In addition to the swipe and credit card approaches, States might want to consider a 
“case manager” approach to help families track the five percent cumulative maximum.  In the 
pre-enrollment phase, children who risk high cost-sharing could be identified at the time of 
enrollment through the use of a health status questionnaire (a practice used by a number of 
State Medicaid programs in their managed care systems).  With this information, States could 
assign this small number of families a case manager to assist the family track both its in-plan 
and out-of-plan expenditures.   
 
 
EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS  
STATES COULD ASK AT ENROLLMENT 
 
 
Does your child have a health problem that requires a lot of medical care? 
 ❏ Yes  ❏ No  
 
Does your child have a health problem that requires a lot of drugs? 
 ❏ Yes  ❏ No 
 
Has your child been hospitalized in the last year? 
 ❏ Yes  ❏ No  
If yes, what was the reason for the hospitalization?_________________ 
  
How many times has your child seen a doctor in the last year? 
 ❏  0   ❏  1-3        ❏ 4-5 ❏  6-10       ❏  11-16   ❏  > 16 times 
 
In the last year, did you spend more than $______ (insert equivalent to the five 
percent of that family’s annual income in dollars) for your child’s health care? 
 ❏ Yes  ❏ No  
 If yes, how much?   $______ 
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Similarly, in the post-enrollment phase, a case manager could be assigned to a child 
whose condition suddenly generates high expenditures following provider notification of such 
cases to the State Medicaid agency.  
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
 This paper has explored various issues in the implementation of CHIP annual aggregate 
cost-sharing protections.  We conclude that the magnitude of the problem may be small, 
because so few children incur high health care costs and because of the manner in which the 
protection is framed in the statute (i.e., excessive costs are measured against annual income).  
We also conclude that only in those States in which a significant proportion of eligible children 
enroll in freestanding programs is the issue of the five percent cap truly significant, since in 
many States the majority of even near-poor children may qualify for Medicaid, where no cost-
sharing is permitted.   
 
We also conclude that, looking at the current situation in those States whose program 
designs do raise excess cost-sharing concerns, we nonetheless conclude that in no State would 
a family be exposed to excess cost-sharing for in-plan services, because the State’s cost-
sharing requirements are limited.  
 
Finally, though the majority of families will not reach the five percent cap, States have an 
obligation under the law to track out-of-pocket expenditures against the cap.  Our discussions 
with plans indicate that the technology does exist to permit States to require participating plans 
to be able to track contract expenditures as a condition of participation.  Swipe cards are 
currently in use for private products that include annual dollar cumulative maximum amounts.  
By translating its percent-of-income cap into a flat dollar cap, as do the States of Utah, 
Kentucky, and Alabama, a State could make it feasible for a plan to use existing technology to 
track member cost-sharing.  The use of a flat dollar limit would not appear to violate the statute. 
 
 At the same time, however, we have identified a series of issues related to cost-sharing 
exposure for families that should be a policy focus for HRSA, HCFA, and State CHIP 
administrators.  First, the statute defines what constitutes an excess aggregate expenditure at a 
high level. The definition of what constitutes excess cost-sharing (i.e., cost-sharing that exceeds 
five percent of annual income) is high both in absolute terms and in relation to how families 
actually spend health care dollars (i.e., in lumps).  While under the five percent cap, a 
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cumulative premium for all children of $50 per month would be considered affordable for lower 
income families, one should also be aware that laying out $50 per month on a gross salary of 
$32,000 with actual take home pay far lower than that poses real difficulties for these families.  
Thus, while the definition of what constitutes “excess” under the statute is high, as a practical 
matter it would not take much to deter a low income family from enrollment.  States that elevate 
their premiums and enrollment fees to this maximum figure risk failure on the part of families to 
enroll until a child is ill and in need of extensive care.    
 
Second, the definition of what constitutes excess cost-sharing relates only to in-plan 
services.  In States with more narrow CHIP plans, this definition means that States could fail to 
take into account expenditures for out-of-plan care, which should be deducted from family 
income.  We recommend that HCFA and HRSA more extensively clarify this issue for States 
and spell out their options in greater detail.  
 
Third, the cost-sharing protection leaves States with considerable leeway to design the 
protections to give families stronger protections.  Basing the calculation of the cap on net 
income and allowing deductions for child care, work-related costs, and out-of-plan health care 
expenditures would appear to be extremely important issues for States to consider.  Yet States 
may not be able to adopt these further protections if they establish stand-alone insurance pools 
for CHIP-insured children, because of the adverse actuarial consequences to their plans of 
liberalizing protections against cost-sharing.  In our opinion, a pool consisting of only a few 
thousand children is not actuarially sound under any circumstance, unless it is accompanied by 
high levels of risk sharing between the plan and the State.  The use of small pools would make 
it nearly impossible for a State to consider any of the options outlined in this analysis.  Indeed, a 
small pool could encourage a State to attempt to deter all enrollment by sick children, fearing 
pull-out by participating plans.  We therefore recommend further study of this pooling issue by 
HCFA and HRSA in order to ensure that freestanding programs do not end up with built-in 
enrollment and utilization deterrents for sick children.  
